Bankruptcy and Creditors\u27 Rights by Cox, Roger S.
SMU Law Review
Volume 58
Issue 3 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 5
2005
Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights
Roger S. Cox
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger S. Cox, Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights, 58 SMU L. Rev. 563 (2005)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol58/iss3/5
BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Roger S. Cox*
I. INTRODUCTION-SCOPE OF ARTICLE ................ 563
II. BANKRUPTCY IN THE SUPREME COURT ........... 564
A. INTEREST RATE ON SECURED CLAIMS IN
CHAPTER 13 .......................................... 564
B. SixTY DAY DISCHARGE OBJECTION DEADLINE NOT
JURISDICTIONAL ....................................... 567
C. OTHER PENDING MATTERs-IRA EXEMPTION? 
. . . . . . . 567
III. BANKRUPTCY AND HOMESTEAD ISSUES IN THE
FIFTH CIRCU IT ......................................... 567
A. TIMING OF VALUATION OF SECURED CLAIMS ......... 567
B. FORECLOSURE SALES IN VIOLATION OF AUTOMATIC
STAY-BONA FIDE PURCHASERS ...................... 568
C. CHAPTER 7 DISCHARGE ............................... 569
IV. BANKRUPTCY COURT CASES ........................ 571
A. RURAL HOMESTEAD-"CONSERVATION RESERVE
PROGRAM" PROPERTY ................................ 571
B. HOUSE(BOAT) IS NOT A HOME(STEAD) ............... 572
C. OBJECTIONS TO DISCHARGE ........................... 572
D. ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND THE CLAIMS OBJECTION
PROCESS .................................. .......... 574
V. OTHER CREDITORS' RIGHTS CASES ................ 575
A. CONTRACTUAL JURY WAIVERS ........................ 575
B. ATTORNEYS' FEES IN COLLECTION CASES ............. 575
VI. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT ......... 577
I. INTRODUCTION-SCOPE OF ARTICLE
This article is limited to developments involving state law, enforcement
of the debtor-creditor relationship in bankruptcy, and cases that might
not otherwise be addressed in a conventional bankruptcy survey. This is
not an exhaustive survey of bankruptcy developments, but rather an up-
date for the Texas based debtor-creditor practitioner.1
* Shareholder, Sanders Baker, Amarillo, Texas; B.S., Texas State University; J.D.,
St. Mary's University School of Law. Board Certified in Business Bankruptcy Law, Texas
Board of Legal Specialization.
1. For other surveys that focus exclusively on bankruptcy law developments, see J.
Westbrook & E. Warren, Recent Developments, University of Texas School of Law Bank-
ruptcy Conference (2003) (providing national survey, with supplement containing Texas
and Fifth Circuit case summaries); G. Pronske, Recent Developments, State Bar of Texas
Advanced Business Bankruptcy Course (2004); see also Alan S. Trust, 2004 Legal Perspec-
tive-Bankruptcy, 68 TEX. B. J. 26 (Jan. 2005).
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II. BANKRUPTCY IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. INTEREST RATE ON SECURED CLAIMS IN CHAPTER 13
In In re Till,2 a plurality of a divided Supreme Court addressed the
appropriate interest rate to be applied to a secured claim in a Chapter 13
"cram down" scenario. To some degree, the plurality fashioned its own
(partial) solution, of which the full effect is unknown. Therefore, it is
necessary to review both the plurality's rationale and the concerns raised
in the dissent.
In the bankruptcy court, the debtors proposed a "prime-plus" or
"formula" rate, which combined the then national prime rate of 8% with
a risk factor of 1.5%, for a total 9.5% rate. The secured creditor sought its
contract rate of 21%, which was the rate it generally charged on so-called
"sub-prime" loans. The debtors offered the testimony of an economics
professor who admitted that he had "limited familiarity with the sub-
prime auto lending market" but described the debtors' suggested formula
rate as "very reasonable" because Chapter 13 plans are "supposed to be
financially feasible."'3 With little or no empirical evidence, the professor
surmised that the creditor's exposure was "fairly limited because [peti-
tioners] are under the supervision of the court."'4
The bankruptcy court apparently adopted the professor's rationale, and
it imposed the debtors' suggested rate. The district court reversed, how-
ever, and the Seventh Circuit endorsed a slightly modified version of the
district court's "coerced" or "forced" loan approach. In effect, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the contract rate should serve as the starting point
absent evidence to the contrary.5
The Supreme Court identified three general approaches: the "coerced
loan," "presumptive contract rate,"' 6 and the "cost of funds." The Court
was critical of each approach and noted that they were complicated, re-
quired significant evidentiary costs, and essentially tilted toward the in-
terest of the affected creditor. Continuing on what can only be described
as a policy-based analysis, the Court adopted its "formula" approach,
which it "has none of these defects."'7 The Court deemed the commercial
prime rate as a starting point because "starting from a concededly low
estimate and adjusting upward places the evidentiary burden squarely on
the creditors, who are likely to have readier access to any information
2. 541 U.S. 465, 124 S. Ct. 1951 (2004).
3. Id. at 1957.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1957-58; see In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh
Circuit further held that the original contract rate should "serve as a presumptive [cram
down] rate," which either party could challenge with evidence that a higher or lower rate
should apply. Id.
6. The presumptive contract rate used by the Seventh Circuit in Till, had also been
approved by the Fifth Circuit. See In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1997); see
also In re Showtime Farms, Inc., 267 B.R. 541 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2000) (discussing interest
rate on deed of trust note in Chapter 12).
7. Till, 124 S. Ct. at 1960-61.
[Vol. 58
Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights
absent from the debtor's filing .... *8
Finally, the Court argued that its "formula" approach would entail "a
straightforward, familiar, and objective inquiry... [minimizing] the need
for potentially costly additional evidentiary proceedings."9 The Court
further posited that a "prime-plus" approach "depends only on the state
of financial markets, the circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, and the
characteristics of the loan, not on the creditor's circumstances or its prior
• . . [relationship] with the debtor."'1  The Court concluded that "the
prime-plus or formula rate best comports with the purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Code."'"
Critically, however, the plurality did not address the appropriate scale
for a risk adjustment, and it provided little guidance for courts faced with
applying this new judge-made approach. Thus, despite the seemingly ob-
jective nature of the plurality's formula approach, a very subjective part
of the formula was left unresolved.' 2 At no point in its analysis did the
plurality provide the statutory source for its reasoning, and the Bank-
ruptcy Code certainly does not express which party ought to bear the
burden on this issue. This simply seemed to be what the plurality thought
was the best policy.
Four justices, with Justice Scalia writing, dissented, pointing out many
flaws in the plurality decision. First, the dissent noted that beginning with
a rate that is admittedly too low and requiring the judge to determine an
appropriate upward adjustment will "systematically undercompensate se-
cured creditors for the true risks of default.'
13
The dissent also exposed the nafve, if not totally unrealistic, rationale
of the debtors' expert that was adopted by the plurality. The rationale
held that Chapter 13 debtors are somehow a substantially lower credit
risk than sub-prime borrowers as a whole. The dissent noted the evidence
before the lower court that the default rate for confirmed Chapter 13
plans is, at best, 37%.14 Observing that the debtors' expert admitted his
limited familiarity with the auto-lending market and his lack of experi-
ence with default rates or costs of collection in that market, the dissent
stated that "it is impossible to view the 1.5% figure as anything other
than a smallish number picked out of a hat."
15
8. Id. at 1961 (emphasis in original). In a footnote, the court added: "We note that, if
the creditor could somehow be certain a debtor would complete his plan, the prime rate
would be adequate to compensate any secured creditors forced to accept cramdown
loans." Id. at 1961 n.18.
9. Id. at 1961.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1962.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 1968 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 1969 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that the actual rate of
plan failure is most likely much higher than the 37% figure, with studies suggesting a fail-
ure rate perhaps as high as 60%. Id. n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 1973-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Policy issues aside, the most problematic aspect of the plurality's
formula approach is that while one component of it is certainly objective,
the other, and perhaps more important component (the upward adjust-
ment) remains totally subjective; courts are given little guidance either by
statute or by the plurality on how to apply that formula. As the dissent
noted, the plurality begins with a number that, "while objective and easily
ascertainable, is indisputably too low."' 16 It then adds a risk premium that
"is neither objective nor easily ascertainable. ' 17 Noting that risk premi-
ums could be substantially greater than the prime rate itself if properly
computed, the dissent observed that "the prime rate becomes the objec-
tive tail wagging a dog of unknown size."' 18
The plurality mentioned several risk factors. The only ones that seem
to be specifically approved, however, include the circumstances of the es-
tate, the nature of the security and its depreciation, the duration and fea-
sibility of the plan, and the probability of plan failure. The "creditor's
circumstances or its prior interactions with the debtor" are no longer con-
sidered risk factors.19
In summary, Till provides little guidance to the bankruptcy courts, and
at least one commentator questions its precedential value.20 Although
Till provides a convenient (albeit incomplete) starting point, it provides
very little guidance thereafter and fails to resolve this issue. In the long
term, the only permanent solution can come from Congress. Meanwhile,
courts and practitioners are each left to their own devices, presumably on
a case-by-case basis, with procedural devices such as standing orders and
operating guidelines even called into question.21
Creative debtor's counsel, for example, may simply file a prime rate
plan that, in the absence of a secured creditor's objection, could be con-
firmed. In the absence of standing orders or court-imposed guidelines
(which, if they survived Till, will vary among jurisdictions) creditors must
proceed with the formality of objecting to every plan until appropriate
precedent is established. Plan feasibility and the rate of depreciation of
collateral are two issues that may now need to be litigated that much
more often in the post-Till environment. 22
16. Id. at 1972 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1973 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 1961. Again, the court does not cite to the Bankruptcy Code to support this
contention.
20. See James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Bankruptcy, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1101,
1128 (2004) ("The lack of a binding majority raises the question of whether Till is binding
precedent.").
21. See In re Smith, 310 B.R. 631, 633-34 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004) (requiring bankruptcy
courts to conduct evidentiary hearings in each case without the use of local practice pure
formula approach).
22. See id. For other commentary on the possible future impact of Till, see generally
James J. Haller, What Till v. SCS Credit Corporation Means for Your Chapter 13 Clients, 92
ILL. B.J. 478 (2004); Ronald Greenspan & Cynthia Nelson, "Untill" We Meet Again-Why
the Till Decision May Not Be the Last Word on Cramdown Interest Rates, 23 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 48 (2005).
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B. SIXTY-DAY DISCHARGE OBJECTION DEADLINE
NOT JURISDICTIONAL
In Kontrick v. Ryan,23 the Court addressed Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a),
which governs the time within which to file an objection to a debtor's
discharge in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 24 In Kontrick, which was addressed
in last year's Texas Survey issue, the Supreme Court ruled that the time
limits in Bankruptcy Rule 4004 are not jurisdictional. Rather, they are to
be considered affirmative defenses that must be raised in a timely respon-
sive pleading.25
C. OTHER PENDING MATrERs-IRA EXEMPTION?
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Rousey v.
Jacoway,26 a case on the applicability of the Bankruptcy Code exemption
for certain retirement plans to an IRA account. The Eighth Circuit in In
re Rousey found that the exemption did not apply, even though the
debtor's IRA was a rollover from a pension plan.
2 7
This case will most likely be decided before the publication date of this
survey.
III. BANKRUPTCY AND HOMESTEAD ISSUES IN THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT
A. TIMING OF VALUATION OF SECURED CLAIMS
In In re Stembridge,28 the Fifth Circuit addressed collateral valuation in
Chapter 13 cases from two perspectives-the timing and the method of
determining the value of property securing a claim in a Chapter 13 case.
The Fifth Circuit stated the timing issue as follows: "at what point in
time should a secured asset be valued for the confirmation of a cram
down plan?" 29 The court held that the property should be valued as of
the time the bankruptcy was filed. This conclusion was the result of the
court's analysis of the concept of adequate protection for the secured
creditor's claim that entitles the secured creditor to the present value of
23. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004).
24. BANKRUPTCY RULE 4004(a) provides as follows:
In a chapter 7 liquidation case a complaint objecting to the debtor's dis-
charge under §727(a) of the Code shall be filed no later than 60 days after
the first date set for the meeting of creditors under §341(a). In a chapter 11
reorganization case, the complaint shall be filed no later than the first date
set for the hearing on confirmation. At least 25 days' notice of the time so
fixed shall be given to the United States trustee and all creditors as provided
in Rule 2002(f) and (k), and to the trustee and the trustee's attorney.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a).
25. See Roger S. Cox, Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights, 57 SMU L. REV. 611, 613-14
(2004).
26. Rousey v. Jacoway, 347 F.3d 689 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2817 (No.
03-1407).
27. In re Rousey, 347 F.3d 689, 693 (8th Cir. 2003).
28. 394 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2004).
29. Id. at 386.
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its claim at the institution of the automatic stay.30
Stembridge also addressed the proper method of valuation. This issue
was partly settled under Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash.31 In Rash,
the United States Supreme Court held that, in a Chapter 13 context, sec-
tion 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code requires a replacement-value stan-
dard to determine the amount of an allowed secured claim. 32 The
bankruptcy court in Stembridge, however, used what was essentially a
trade-in valuation. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that bankruptcy
courts still retain some discretion in determining the replacement value.
Given the evidence before the lower court, however, the Fifth Circuit
found that the bankruptcy court erred in disregarding a full-replacement-
cost valuation. 33
As a result of Stembridge, the Fifth Circuit values depreciable property
securing claims in Chapter 13 cases based upon full replacement value of
the property as of the date of the bankruptcy filing.
B. FORECLOSURE SALES IN VIOLATION OF AUTOMATIC STAY-BONA
FIDE PURCHASERS
In In re Cueva,34 a real property foreclosure sale occurred some hours
after notice of a bankruptcy filing had been faxed to the lender's counsel.
Apparently, lender's counsel did not notify the substitute trustee, and the
sale went forward. Two purchasers working together were the successful
bidders; each agreed to purchase an undivided one-half interest in the
property. The purchasers also signed a "Purchaser's Acknowledgment...
that the sale was subject to bankruptcy by the debtor. ' 35
After learning of the bankruptcy filing, the lender reinstated the debt
and returned funds to the foreclosing lawyers. One of the purchasers, de-
spite learning of the bankruptcy, purchased the other one-half interest
about five months after the sale.
The purchaser then brought an adversary proceeding seeking a declara-
tion that the post-bankruptcy foreclosure sale was valid and not violative
of the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court awarded the buyer an undi-
vided one-half interest in the property based upon his status as a pur-
ported good faith purchaser without notice of the bankruptcy at the time
of the sale. The court concluded that, although the sale violated § 362,
the purchaser did not have notice of the bankruptcy and therefore was a
good faith purchaser. The other one-half interest was awarded to the
debtor on grounds that the sale to the other original purchaser was void
30. Id. at 387; see also In re Longbine, 256 B.R. 470, 475 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000).
31. 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
32. Id. at 965.
33. Stembridge, 394 F.3d at 386. ("Had the bankruptcy court determined that the re-placement value was best captured by the Trade Value, we would find no error. However,
the bankruptcy court explicitly premised the Trade Value on the foreclosure value of the
vehicle, contrary to Rash's holding.").
34. 371 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2004).
35. Id. at 234.
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because of his knowledge of the bankruptcy at the time of the sale.
36
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's reversal of the bankruptcy
court, finding that the sale in violation of the automatic stay was invalid,
regardless of whether the creditor acted with knowledge of the bank-
ruptcy. 37 In the Fifth Circuit, sales in violation of the stay are voidable
and not necessarily void. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit noted that bank-
ruptcy courts may grant retroactive annulment or modification of the
stay. In Cueva, however, unlike an earlier Fifth Circuit case, no party
requested such retroactive relief, and no such relief was granted.
38
The Fifth Circuit also held that a "bona fide purchaser defense" was
not a defense to a claim that a foreclosure sale violated the automatic
stay. Rather, the Fifth Circuit held that such a defense, which arises under
§ 549(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, was not applicable to a sale in violation
of the stay.
39
C. CHAPTER 7 DISCHARGE
The Fifth Circuit addressed the right to a Chapter 7 discharge in at
least three different cases. Unfortunately, each of these opinions were
unpublished at time of publication for the Texas Survey. Given the im-
portance of guidance from the Fifth Circuit on this issue, however, they
are addressed below.
In In re Mitchell,40 the Fifth Circuit reversed a bankruptcy court's find-
ings of whether Chapter 7 debtors made a false oath or account in viola-
tion of § 727(a)(4)(A). 4 1 The court found that the debtor's failure to
amend schedules or take other action to correct errors and omissions con-
stituted a "reckless disregard for the truth," which resulted in a denial of
their discharge under § 727(a)(4). 42 The court was apparently struck by
the fact that the errors and omissions did not consist of a single, isolated
36. Id. at 235-36.
37. Id. at 239.
38. Id. at 236; see Jones v. Garcia, 63 F.3d 411, 412 (5th Cir. 1995) (retroactive relief
from stay granted to validate a voidable, but not void, sale); see also In re Calder, 907 F.2d
953, 956 (10th Cir. 1990).
39. In re Cueva, 371 F.3d at 238 ("In short, § 549(c) is not an exception to the auto-
matic stay imposed by § 362, and there is no authority to support [the purchaser's] position
to the contrary.").
40. 102 Fed. Appx. 860 (5th Cir. 2004).
41. Section 727(a)(4) provides that a Chapter 7 debtor will receive a discharge, unless:
The debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case -(A) made a false oath or account;
(B) presented or used a false claim;(C) ***
(D) withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to possession under this
title, any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and
papers, relating to the debtor's property or financial affairs.
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) (2004). This is a common basis for denying a discharge under § 727.
Other common grounds include the conveyance or concealment of property with the intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor within a year prior to the bankruptcy and the failure
to explain the loss of assets or deficiency of assets to meet a debtor's liabilities. 11 U.S.C§ 727(a)(2), (5) (2004).
42. In re Mitchell, 102 Fed. Appx. at 862. According to the Fifth Circuit:
2005]
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mistake; rather, the court found that the debtors filed their schedules with
a flagrant disregard for the truth. The magnitude of all errors, combined
with the debtors' apparent disregard for the obligations of absolute hon-
esty in the bankruptcy process, proved too much for the Fifth Circuit to
allow. 4
3
In re Andrews 44 provides somewhat of a contrast. In Andrews, a num-
ber of assets were transferred out of a debtor's name before the petition
filing because of the family's concern about the debtor's mental and phys-
ical health and his ability to avoid the loss of those assets. The Fifth Cir-
cuit found that this was a legitimate concern, and the transfers were
accomplished without the requisite intent under § 727(a)(2). 45
In In re Womble,46 a discharge was denied under § 727(a)(3), which
provides that a discharge may be denied for failure to maintain adequate
financial records or a failure to explain the pre-petition loss of assets.47
In Womble, the creditor satisfied its initial burden of establishing the fail-
ure to preserve adequate financial records, shifting the burden to Wom-
ble to justify that failure. 48
The court found that the debtor was relatively sophisticated and should
have maintained adequate financial records. More importantly, it ap-
The Mitchells made the following errors and omissions in their bankruptcyfilings: (1) they provided only half a month's income in response to a ques-
tion that demanded a full month's income; (2) they initially listed a life insur-
ance policy as having no cash value and a face value of $15,000, though it
actually had a cash value of approximately $3,500 and a face value of$100,000; (3) they omitted multiple payments made to creditors within 90
days of bankruptcy; (4) in their initial filing, they did not list a counterclaim
against Cadle as an asset even though they listed Cadle's claim against them
as a liability; (5) they failed to list Mr. Mitchell's substantial vintage-car re-
furbishing tools in their initial schedules, and their final amended schedules
did not include all of the tools and undervalued the remainder; and (6) they
omitted a set of Wedgewood china.
Id.
43. Id. at 862-63. The court cited numerous cases where a debtor's cavalier attitude orfailure to fully address the necessity of accuracy in their schedules supported a denial of
their discharge. Id. at 863 n.3; see e.g., In re Hatton, 204 B.R. 477, 485 (Bankr. E.D. Va.1997) (saying a mere "glance over" of a debtor' s schedules constituted a reckless disregardfor the truth); In re Gonday, 27 B.R. 428, 433 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1983) ("Individually, any
one answer may have been the result of an innocent mistake. However, the cumulative
effect of all the falsehoods together evidences a pattern of reckless and cavalier disregardfor the truth .... "). For another Fifth Circuit opinion during the survey period, see In reLopez, 111 Fed. Appx. 725 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing debtor/lawyer who failed to schedule
contingent fees and other received fees).
44. 98 Fed. Appx. 290 (5th Cir. 2004).
45. Id. Section 727 specifically requires that the transfer be done with the "intent tohinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate." In the absence of thatintent, the discharge should be granted. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (2004).
46. 108 Fed. Appx. 993 (5th Cir. 2004).
47. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(3), (5).
48. The level of the debtor's sophistication and extent of business activities is an issue.The court added: "The justification inquiry should include the education, experience, and
sophistication of the debtor; the volume of the debtor's business; the complexity of thedebtor's business; the amount of credit extended to the debtor in his business; and any
other circumstances that should be considered in the interest of justice." Womble, 108 Fed.Appx. at 996 (citing Meridian Bank v. Alten, 958 F.2d 1226, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992)).
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peared that Womble controlled various business entities that engaged in
numerous transfers. Although Womble apparently had records of what
amounted to cash flow in and out of his estate, he had no records estab-
lishing the basis for such transfers, and he apparently failed to file tax
returns for certain of those business entities for some years.
49
IV. BANKRUPTCY COURT CASES
A. RURAL HOMESTEAD-"CONSERVATION RESERVE
PROGRAM" PROPERTY
In In re Baker,50 the debtor claimed her undivided one-third interest in
a 161-acre tract as a rural homestead. The property was not contiguous
with the five acre tract on which her actual home was situated. The 161-
acre tract was formerly used by the debtor as grazing land for cattle; how-
ever, it had been placed in the Conservation Reserve Program ("CRP").
According to the debtor, her twenty-one-year old son still lived with her,
and he occasionally hunted on the 161-acre tract. Just before her bank-
ruptcy was filed, however, the debtor entered into a contract for sale cov-
ering the entire 161-acre tract. As of the bankruptcy, however, the sale
was not completed.51
A creditor objected to the homestead claims and argued that the place-
ment of the 161-acre tract in the CRP combined with the debtor's subse-
quent contract for sale divested the land of its homestead protection. The
creditor's position was based primarily upon a series of cases holding that
non-contiguous tracts on which rent houses are located may deprive the
property of its rural homestead character. Those opinions, however, are
premised upon the conclusion that mere collection of rent without a pre-
sent right of possession defeats the homestead claim.52 Judge Jones
found those cases distinguishable. In a situation involving the CRP, the
debtor is indeed paid for taking land out of cultivation. The debtor, how-
ever, is not precluded from other common uses of the land, and she is still
entitled to full possession and control of the property.
5 3
Additionally, the mere execution of a contract for sale did not deprive
the debtor of her homestead claim. Because the homestead was estab-
lished in the first place, it was presumed to continue until there was proof
of abandonment. Execution of a contract for sale contingent upon third
party financing did not divest the land of its homestead protection. Ac-
49. Id. During the survey period, a number of other cases were centered on this issue.
See e.g., In re Geller, 314 B.R. 800, 807 (Bankr. D.N.D. 2004) (in saying piano and other
assets not listed; debtors simply "perused" schedules); In re Mantra, 314 B.R. 723, 731
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (covering undocumented gambling losses); In re McNamara, 310
B.R. 664, 668 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2004) ("double or nothing" wager on assets to have been
turned over to ex-wife); In re Reed, 310 B.R. 363, 368 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004) (saying so-
called "bad habits" was an inadequate explanation).
50. 307 B.R. 860 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003).
51. Id. at 862.
52. Id. at 863 (citing In re Webb, 263 B.R. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001)).
53. Id. at 863.
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cordingly, the debtor's homestead claim was upheld. 54
B. HOUSE(BOAT) IS NOT A HOME(STEAD)
Texas courts have long attempted to liberally construe homestead
claims in favor of the claimant. In an apparent case of first impression,
however, this liberal construction did not extend to such a claim in a mov-
able houseboat. In In re Norris,55 the debtors listed a street address in
northeast San Antonio on their schedules and claimed a 68-foot Chris
Craft boat as a homestead. The bankruptcy court upheld the trustee's
objection, and the district court affirmed.
The district court based its opinion primarily upon its construction of
both the homestead statute and earlier authority that generally refers to
interests in land. Even earlier cases dealing with manufactured homes
generally addressed structures that could be placed upon or fixed to
land.5 6 The court also found authoritative support from other states, in-
cluding Florida. In the end, the court determined that the boat, "by virtue
of its self-powered mobility, is a moveable chattel, not a permanent resi-
dence entitled to homestead protection. '57
C. OBJECTIONS TO DISCHARGE
In addition to In re Mitchell, discussed above, another case provides a
different perspective on objections to a debtor's discharge under § 727. In
In re Lee,58 Judge Leif Clark addressed the limits of conduct that a debtor
may engage in while maintaining the right to a discharge. Judge Clark's
opinion provides a thorough analysis of various sub-sections of § 724, but
the case is perhaps most helpful in the context of the debtors' pre-bank-
ruptcy planning debt against their exempt homestead.
In Lee, the debtors sold a business and expected that they would not
continue to realize the proceeds of that sale. They owned a homestead,
but it appeared that continuing to make the mortgage payment would be
difficult. They were able to generate cash proceeds from certain non-ex-
empt assets, a substantial portion of which were used to pay down the
debt against their homestead. After effectively converting some non-ex-
empt assets into an investment in their exempt homestead, the Lees filed
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A creditor filed an adversary proceeding ob-jecting to the Lees' discharge, alleging, among other things, that the pre-
54. Id. at 863-64 ("Homesteads are to be liberally construed."). See In re Perry, 345
F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Painewebber, Inc. v. Murray, 260 B.R. 815, 830-32 (Bankr.
E.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that non-contiguous land on which debtor chopped wood, built a
duck blind, irrigated, farmed, and used for walking, picnicking, growing hay, and hunting
constituted a rural homestead).
55. 316 B.R. 246 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2004).
56. Id. at 250. See Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v. Walker, 448 S.W.2d 830, 837 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cullers v. James, 1 S.W. 314 (Tex. 1886).
57. Norris, 316 B.R. at 251 (basing this conclusion partly on the case of In re Hacker,
260 B.R. 542 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000)).
58. 309 B.R. 468 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2004).
[Vol. 58
Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights
bankruptcy transfers ultimately reducing the debtors' homestead mort-
gage violated § 727(a)(2)'s prohibition against fraudulent transfers. 59
The court found that the debtors clearly "chose to maximize the value
of their exempt property by selling non-exempt property and using the
proceeds to pay off liens on their exempt [homestead]." '60 The debtors
also were aware that there was a good chance they would have lost their
homestead considering their age and bleak prospects for future income.
"Thus, they were likely not only to be rendered penniless by the pending
lawsuits, but also destitute (and homeless) through the loss of their home-
stead to eventual foreclosure. '61 The court noted that with the advice of
counsel the debtors clearly took actions to maximize their exemptions,
paying off one creditor at the expense of others.
62
In an effort to apply a consistent standard to pre-bankruptcy planning
to maximize otherwise legitimate exemptions, the court reviewed often-
cited Fifth Circuit cases addressing this issue. The court, however, was
more persuaded by an Arizona bankruptcy case (that analyzed the Fifth
Circuit cases). 63 The Arizona case opines that the best rule does not pe-
nalize pre-bankruptcy exemption planning per se; rather, it restricts the
application of § 727(a)(2) to situations "in which there is extensive evi-
dence of fraudulent intent, apart from the intent to maximize one's exemp-
tions."64 The court acknowledged that the seemingly inconsistent Fifth
Circuit decisions were based upon somewhat unique facts. The court also
noted the Fifth Circuit's statement in Reed that
[w]hile pre-bankruptcy conversion of non-exempt into exempt assets
is frequently motivated by the intent to put those assets beyond the
reach of creditors, which is, after all, the function of an exemption,
evidence of actual intent to defraud creditors is required to support a
finding sufficient to deny a discharge.
65
In the end, the court found that the Lees' pre-bankruptcy planning was
not motivated by an actual intent to defraud their creditors, and the debt-
ors were properly granted their discharge.66 This is clearly a sound deci-
59. Id. at 473-74. Section 727(a)(2)(A) provides that a bankruptcy court may deny a
debtor's discharge upon showing that "the debtor, with the intent to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud a creditor or an officer of the estate ... has transferred ... or has permitted to be
transferred ... property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of the
petition..." 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) (2004). See also In re Dennis, 330 F.3d 696, 701 (5th
Cir. 2003).
60. Lee, 309 B.R. at 481.
61. Id. at 482.
62. Id.
63. Id. The court was persuaded by In re Crater, 286 B.R. 756 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002).
The court noted the somewhat inconsistent results among the three Fifth Circuit cases
mentioned in its opinion. Crater, 286 B.R. at 769-70; see, e.g., In re Swift, 3 F.3d 929 (5th
Cir. 1993); In re Bowyer, 932 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1991); First Tex. Sav. Ass'n v. Reed (In re
Reed), 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
64. Lee, 309 B.R. at 482 (emphasis added) (citing Crater, 286 B.R. at 771). See also
Reed, 700 F.2d at 991.
65. Lee, 309 B.R. at 483 (quoting Reed, 700 F.2d at 991 (emphasis added by the Lee
court)).
66. Id. at 486-87.
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sion-had Congress intended to prohibit maximizing one's exemptions,
appropriate provisions could have been included in the Bankruptcy Code,
especially under sections 523 or 727.67 There is no such prohibition in the
Code, and in the absence of clear fraud or other improper activity, legiti-
mate pre-bankruptcy exemption planning should not, by itself, place an
otherwise honest debtor's discharge at risk.
D. ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND THE CLAIMS OBJECTION PROCESS
In In re Mirant Corp.,68 the bankruptcy court addressed the conflicting
policies of the enforceability of commercial arbitration clauses and the
unique power of the bankruptcy court to adjudicate objections to claims.
The case turned partly upon what has become known as the National
Gypsum test, which essentially looks to the underlying nature of the pro-
ceeding before the bankruptcy court-that is, "whether the proceeding
derives exclusively from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and, if so,
whether arbitration ... would conflict with the purposes of the Code.' '69
Under the National Gypsum test, if a proceeding does not derive exclu-
sively from the Code, then a bankruptcy court would abstain and allow
the parties to arbitrate. On the other hand, the court may deny arbitra-
tion if the matter arises directly from the Code and arbitration would
conflict with its purpose.70
In Mirant, the court found that the allowance, disallowance, or estima-
tion of claims are core proceedings; it was "Congress's intent to leave
quantification of a claim to the bankruptcy court. 71 Therefore, the court
found that when the claim objection process was implicated, the arbitra-
tion clause would not be enforced, and the bankruptcy court would be the
proper forum to adjudicate the claim.72
67. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (2004).
68. In re Mirant Corp., 316 B.R. 234 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004).
69. In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 1067 (5th Cir. 1997).
70. Id. at 1069.
71. Mirant, 316 B.R. at 239.
72. Id. at 239-40. The court continued:
The allowance, disallowance and estimation of claims against Debtors are
core proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §157(b)(2)(B). Section 502(b) of
the Code also evidences Congress's intent to leave quantification of a claim
to the bankruptcy court when a party in interest objects to the claim. This
procedure for liquidation of claims against a bankruptcy estate and their al-
lowance and disallowance is at the very heart of the bankruptcy court's func-
tion and purpose. This court does not therefore read Nat'l Gypsum as
empowering parties to use an arbitration clause to divest the bankruptcy
court of its generally pervasive authority to control quantification of claims
merely because the substance of a claim objection is rooted in state law.
Id.; see also In re UAL Corp., 310 B.R. 373, 377 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) ("It has long been
recognized that one of the essential, 'core' functions of bankruptcy is the allowance or
disallowance of claims against the debtor's estate, without regard to the source of the
claim.").
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V. OTHER CREDITORS' RIGHTS CASES
A. CONTRACTUAL JURY WAIVERS
In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America73 arose as a suit for rescis-
sion of a commercial lease. There are, however, significant implications
for practitioners addressing loan documentation, as well as enforcement
of loan documents and other contracts. In Prudential, the parties exe-
cuted a commercial lease that included a contractual waiver of trial by
jury. When the tenant and its guarantors sued for rescission and damages,
they demanded a jury trial. The landlord moved to quash the demand,
which the trial court denied. The landlord obtained mandamus relief to
enforce of the jury waiver as written.74
The tenant argued that a contract to waive a trial by jury is contrary to
public policy derived from both the state constitution and rules of civil
procedure. The court, however, was more convinced by concepts such as
freedom of contract and the enforcement of arbitration clauses, forum
selection clauses, and the like.
75
The Texas Supreme Court also noted that numerous other states and at
least one Texas Court of Appeals had already considered the issue.76 Fi-
nally, the tenant/guarantors also asserted the lack of conspicuousness,
noting that the waiver was in the fifty-third paragraph of a sixty-seven
paragraph document and far from the signature line. They also argued
that at least one of the parties had not actually read the contract. The
court concluded, however, that if the contractual provision otherwise met
the elements of a knowing and voluntary waiver, it would be enforceable.
This has obvious implications for the practitioner. It appears that in
light of Prudential and the authorities cited within, contractual jury waiv-
ers will be enforced in the vast majority of circumstances. This seems to
include such waivers in promissory notes, deeds of trust, security agree-
ments, and other loan documents.
B. ATTORNEYS' FEES IN COLLECTION CASES
Although not necessarily a new development, at least two cases during
the survey period dealt with the award of attorneys' fees in collection
scenarios-specifically, attorneys' fees that exceeded the amount in con-
troversy. In Sibley v. RMA Partners,77 the trial court awarded $82,748.50
in attorneys' fees incurred in the enforcement of two notes, the total pay-
off of which was approximately $43,000. The First District Court of Ap-
73. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004).
74. Id. at 127.
75. Id. at 130-31; see also DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex.
1990) (stating that parties may select applicable law, which courts will enforce in respect
for policy of protecting parties' expectation; such clauses will be enforced within reason-
i.e., some contact to the jurisdiction of the choice of law, consistency with public policy,
etc.).
76. Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132-33 (citing In re Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota N.A.,
115 S.W.3d 600, 606-08 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)).
77. 138 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.).
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peals affirmed the trial court's award of attorneys' fees based upon the
trial court's consideration of "the nature and complexity of the case, the
amount in controversy, the amount of time and effort required, and the
expertise of counsel in arriving at a reasonable amount as attorneys'
fees." 78
Although the court acknowledged that the attorneys' fees seemed ex-
cessive in comparison to the amount owed, the court emphasized that
such a comparison is but one of the factors that the trial court could have
considered.79 The Sibley court also acknowledged that a contractual at-
torneys' fees provision would take priority over Chapter 38 of the Civil
Practice & Remedies Code, which generally requires presentment of a
claim before attorney's fees may be awarded under that statute. 80
A similar result was reached in Cordova v. Southwestern Bell Yellow
Pages, Inc.81 In Cordova, over $20,000 in attorneys' fees were awarded on
a $7,092 claim.82 Although attorneys' fees "must bear some reasonable
relationship to the amount in controversy," the Cordova court also ac-
knowledged that the amount of damages is but one of many factors to be
considered. 83
Cordova involved a counterclaim in which the fees awarded to the
plaintiff included those incurred in defending the counterclaim. The court
addressed the issue of segregation of fees. Because the plaintiff had to
overcome the defendant's counterclaims in order to prevail on its under-
lying debt collection, the court did not require segregation and affirmed
the award of fees despite the overlap in developing the case and defend-
ing the counterclaim. 84
78. Id. at 458 (quoting Stamp-Ad, Inc. v. Barton Raben, Inc., 915 S.W.2d 932, 937
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
79. Id. at 459. See Flint & Assoc. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d
622, 626 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied) (approving attorneys' fee award of $162,000
when actual damages were under $25,000).
80. Sibley, 138 S.W.3d at 457-58.
81. 148 S.W.3d 441 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.).
82. Id. at 444.
83. Id. at 448; see also Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990, no writ) (upholding a $92,000 fee on $28,000 claim).
According to Cordova, the following factors are considered by Texas courts:
(1) the time and labor involved, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly;
(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will pre-
clude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers perform-
ing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty
of collection before the legal services have been rendered.
Cordova, 148 S.W.3d at 448 (citing Acad. Corp. v. Interior Buildout & Turnkey Constr.,
Inc., 21 S.W.3d 732, 741 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.)).
84. Cordova, 148 S.W.3d at 447-49.
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VI. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
During the survey period, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
two cases regarding activities governed by the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act ("FDCPA"), which governs consumer debt collection.8 5 In Gos-
wami v. American Collections Enterprise, Inc.,86 the debt collector's letter
contained a half-inch-thick blue bar across the entire envelope, and read
"Priority Letter." The letter itself contained a similar blue bar and the
"Priority Letter" marking as a header. Additionally, the letter contained
a sub-heading entitled "Settlement Offer & Amnesty," which represented
that the debt collector had a limited period of time (30 days) to settle the
unpaid balance at a stated discount. In fact, the creditor had authorized
the debt collector to give such a discount at any time, not just for the 30
day period referenced in the letter.
The Fifth Circuit addressed two issues. First, it addressed whether the
use of the "Priority Letter" marking violated the FDCPA's prohibition
against certain markings on debt-collection-letter envelopes; second, it
addressed whether the language in the letter regarding the limited settle-
ment period was false or misleading and in violation of the FDCPA.
The court found that the simple marking of a "Priority Letter" did not
violate the FDCPA's prohibition against using "any language or symbol,
other than the debt collector's address, on any envelope when communi-
cating with a consumer .... "87 The Fifth Circuit found the FDCPA to be
ambiguous on this issue, so it turned to legislative history and Federal
Trade Commission interpretations. It noted that, according to the FTC, a
debt collector does not violate the section in question by using words or
notations that do not suggest the purpose of the communication. Because
the phrase "Priority Letter" was somewhat benign and similar to the
other "harmless words or symbols" previously approved by the FTC, the
court held that such printed language does not violate the FDCPA.
The body of the letter of itself, however, "trigger[ed] greater con-
cern." 88 The court found that the debt collector's statement that the dis-
counted settlement was available "only during the next thirty days" was a
false or misleading statement, considering the standing authority actually
85. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692o (1998). The FDCPA applies only to debts
incurred for personal, family, or household use and not for commercial or business debts.
See First Gibraltar Bank v. Smith, 62 F.3d 133 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing the guaranty of
commercial debt); Holman v. West Valley Collection Servs., Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 935 (D.
Minn. 1999) (discussing an agricultural loan).
86. 377 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2004).
87. Id. at 492-94. The FDCPA provides that a debt collector "may not use unfair or
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt." The statute then provides
a list of examples of violations, including the following:
(8) using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector's address, on
any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by
telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such
name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business."
15 U.S.C.A. §1692f (1998).
88. Goswami, 377 F.3d at 495.
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granted to the debt collector.89 Although the court agreed with the gen-
eral policy encouraging settlement offers, such a policy would not allow
the use of false or misleading statements in the process. Therefore, the
court found the debt collector's "deception" actionable under the
FDCPA and "not excused because it is part of a debt collector's settle-
ment offer."90
The implications of this finding are obvious. Lawyers have long used a
variety of techniques to initiate and continue settlement discussions, in-
cluding limited disclosure of the nature and extent of a client's settlement
authority. By this holding, however, a "debt collector" may no longer
conceal or misrepresent actual settlement authority in attempting to set-
tle a debt under the FDCPA.
In Owsley v. Coldata, Inc.,91 the court issued a per curiam opinion re-
garding a debt collector's statement in a letter to the effect that an ac-
count was "scheduled to be returned to [the creditor] who may [among
other things] ... secure advice of counsel regarding appropriate steps to
be taken to enforce payment. '92 The debtor contended that the letter
violated section 1962e(10) of the FDCPA93 because it created a false im-
pression that the debtor's account would be turned over to a lawyer for
legal action. The court noted that the letter did not imply that a lawsuit
was imminent or that the debt collector had "any say in whether legal
action would be taken. ' 94 To the contrary, the letter indicated a number
of different actions the creditor could take. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's summary judgment in favor of the debt collector.
This opinion is worth noting primarily because it is indicative of the
standard used by the Fifth Circuit in addressing FDCPA claims. As the
court stated: "We have not decided whether to view collection notices
from the standpoint of the 'least sophisticated consumer' or the 'unso-
phisticated consumer.' [T]he difference between the standards is de mini-
mus at most."'95 In Owsley, the court simply concluded that it did not
believe that a recipient of Coldata's letter "with any degree of sophistica-
tion" would believe that legal action was imminent.96
89. Id. at 495.
90. Id. at 496.
91. 104 Fed. Appx. 994 (5th Cir. 2004).
92. Id. at 995.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1) (1998) (providing that a debt collector may not use a false,
misleading, or deceptive representation in collecting a debt covered by the FDCPA).
94. Owsley, 104 Fed. Appx. at 995.
95. Id. (quoting Peter v. G.C. Servs., 310 F.3d 344, 348 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002)).
96. Id.; see Gammon v. G.C. Servs., 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994).
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